South Korean technology companies are facing a crisis.

Every year, billions of dollars of sensitive intellectual property is leaked abroad, aiding overseas competitors and threatening the country’s long-term economic resilience.

In 2024, the destination for over 75% of these stolen trade secrets was China.

Despite efforts by South Korean agencies to tighten enforcement and safeguard critical technologies, one government-backed organization is taking a very different approach.

Meet KIC China (글로벌혁신센터), a South Korean initiative designed to help startups expand into the PRC. On paper, it’s a platform for global growth. In practice, it’s a pipeline that may be exposing Korean firms to high-risk partnerships with Chinese entities tied to state-backed tech transfer programs, military-linked universities, and the United Front.

To be clear, this report does not allege any illegal activity by KIC China. However, several of its activities raise significant red flags that Korean companies and policymakers should not ignore. Given that China is the destination for the vast majority of Korea’s stolen technologies, and many of KIC China’s partners have close ties to the Chinese government, KIC China’s approach especially concerning. It is all the more surprising in light of ongoing efforts by other Korean agencies to prevent exactly this kind of technology transfer.

The research I’ve done for this report barely scratches the surface of KIC China’s activities. I reviewed a fraction of the publications related to this organization, and yet I still found connections between KIC China and the Chinese government, military-linked universities, military-civil fusion funders, and tech transfer groups.

Let’s take a look at this organization, what they’re doing, and why. The post is broken down as follows:

  1. KIC China’s Official Mission and Activities
  2. Strategic Sectors and Tech Transfer Risks
  3. Partners Tied to Beijing’s State Apparatus
  4. South Korean Firms Caught in the Middle
  5. Conclusion: Balancing Innovation and Security

KIC China’s Official Mission and Activities

The Korea Innovation Center (KIC) China was established in 2016 under South Korea’s Ministry of Science and ICT and the National Research Foundation as a nonprofit platform to help Korean high-tech startups expand into the Chinese market. Based in Beijing’s Zhongguancun tech district, KIC China’s stated role is to provide Korean innovators a roadmap for China entry and serve as a bridge for cooperation in science and technology. But it also emphasizes it’s role as a facilitator of technology transfer from Korean startups to China, with multiple announcements on their website stating that they do things like “actively support the commercialization of overseas (China) technology transfer for private domestic companies and technologies” (국내 민간기업·기술의 해외(중국) 기술이전 사업화를 적극 지원).

In practice, this means organizing forums, “demo days”, and exhibitions where Korean companies can showcase their technology to Chinese investors and officials. KIC China promotes sectors that both Korea and China deem strategic, including artificial intelligence, robotics, semiconductors, biotech, and renewable energy.

Let’s look at one example of KIC China’s recent activities. Last month, they held the Korea-China Science and Technology Innovation Cooperation Forum in Beijing. Co-hosted with the Beijing Science & Technology Commission and Zhongguancun authorities, this forum focused on AI and robotics. Participants exchanged the latest AI/robotics trends and discussed building a joint innovation platform. KIC China portrays such forums as mutually beneficial exchanges of ideas. However, the presence of Chinese state technology agencies at these forums hints at China’s interest in absorbing foreign advances in these critical fields.

Among the participants on the Chinese side were representatives from:

Because these groups are working in areas critical for the success of China’s industrial policies, they are guaranteed to have close ties to multiple Chinese government entities, including networks like the United Front Work Department (UFWD) and the chief intelligence agency, the Ministry of State Security (MSS). As far as I can tell, KIC China does not state whether or not it vets the participants in these events for connections to these kinds of groups.

KIC China also runs networking and pitch events branded “K-Demo Day” to directly connect Korean startups with Chinese capital and partners. In April 2023, for instance, KIC China and the Shanghai Technology Exchange jointly hosted an online K-Demo Day focused on hydrogen energy and cleantech. Ten Korean firms – ranging from fuel cell developers to hydrogen infrastructure startups – pitched their innovations to a large Chinese audience. Over 30 investment institutions and 20 Chinese corporations participated, such as BAIC Foton, King Long, and JAC Group, which are major Chinese automakers.

Another KIC activity is supporting Korean participation in China’s big tech expos. In November 2024, KIC China became the first Korean institution to host a booth in the “Innovation Incubation” zone of the China International Import Expo (CIIE) in Shanghai. It sponsored six Korean startups – including AI avatar maker DeepBrain AI – to exhibit their products and solutions to the Chinese market. DeepBrain AI, for example, demonstrated its cutting-edge “AI Studios” platform that auto-generates realistic digital human videos, drawing crowds at the KIC China booth with its live demos. DeepBrain’s technology, which integrates speech synthesis and computer vision to create AI avatars, garnered attention from industry visitors for its potential applications in marketing, education, and even government services.

From KIC’s perspective, initiatives like CIIE booths and demo days help Korean startups gain exposure and funding in the world’s second-largest economy. Indeed, some participating firms have secured Chinese clients or investment leads through these programs. However, such exposure is a double-edged sword – the more Korean innovators reveal their proprietary tech in Chinese venues, the more they risk intellectual property leakage or imitation by local competitors.

Strategic Sectors and Tech Transfer Risks

Many of the sectors KIC China deals with – AI, robotics, semiconductors, new energy, biotech – overlap directly with Beijing’s industrial policies laid out in its Five-Year Plans and its Made in China 2025 ambitions. Chinese state planners have explicitly prioritized acquiring and indigenizing advanced technologies in these areas. By encouraging Korean firms to collaborate and share know-how in China, KIC China’s programs may inadvertently serve China’s tech self-sufficiency drive.

Semiconductors are a case in point. This industry is core to South Korea’s economy but is also a top target in China’s industrial strategy. According to Korean National Police data, out of 27 cases of overseas technology leakage investigated in 2024, 20 involved illicit transfer to China, with semiconductor-related secrets being the most frequently stolen. Despite this, technology exchange in the semiconductor sector is prevalent in KIC China activities and publications.

One of the most bewildering KIC China-sponsored events is promoted directly on the group’s landing page. The “2025 KIC China Startup Competition - 12 National Strategic Technologies” encourages Korean startups working in one of Korea’s most sensitive “national strategic” fields to go to China and present their work in a competition in partnership with a slew of China state-linked entities. It defies belief that this does not pose a blatant and unnecessary risk to South Korean economic security. It also directly contradicts other government ministries’ warnings about protecting these technologies from adversarial state actors.

A screenshot of the KIC China homepage showing an event for Korean companies to share “National Strategic Technologies” with China.

The interest shown in Korean “national strategic technologies” by China’s state-backed groups is not benign. Chinese firms and funds sometimes pursue “investment” as a means to obtain foreign IP – either by requiring technology transfer into joint ventures or simply reverse-engineering products post-investment. South Korean companies, familiar with past cases of being cut out after their know-how was obtained, cannot help but be wary. Even Zhang Zhang, secretary-general of China’s state-run International Technology Transfer Network (ITTN), acknowledged in an interview that many Koreans inevitably link tech cooperation with China to “technology leakage or theft” due to the history of such incidents.

Then there is the risk of dual-use technology proliferation. KIC China does not handle military secrets or anything explicitly defense-related. Its focus is on civilian startups. However, the dual-use nature of many emerging technologies blurs this line.

In one KIC-arranged forum in Guangzhou in late 2024, Korean hydrogen fuel cell companies met with Chinese counterparts in the Greater Bay Area Science Forum (GSF) – an event co-hosted by China’s Ministry of Science and Technology – to explore collaboration. Hydrogen energy is a civilian green technology, but it also has potential military applications (e.g. fuel cells for drones or submarines). The Korean firms presented their innovations to an audience that included Chinese state researchers and investors. KIC China even signed an MOU there with a Guangdong science association to sustain cooperation in hydrogen and advanced tech. This close engagement in a strategic field could accelerate Chinese companies’ access to cutting-edge fuel cell designs.

Dual-use technologies are especially susceptible for misappropriation when they are accessed by PLA-linked entities in China. This makes the promotion of exchanges between KIC China and China’s Seven Sons of National Defense universities particularly troubling. In 2019, KIC China organized a visit by Korea researchers to Beihang University, known for its defense engineering labs and close ties to the military. The KIC China website also has a special section for quantum computing, promoting research ties between Korean scientists and Chinese institutes like the Beijing Institute of Technology, which highlights its scholars’ connections to talent programs that are known to facilitate illicit knowledge acquisition.

Partners Tied to Beijing’s State Apparatus

KIC China’s network in China reads like a who’s who of state-backed technology acquisition. Its events and initiatives are frequently co-organized or sponsored by Chinese government agencies and government-linked organizations. This raises questions about whether KIC China’s platform truly serves bilateral exchange or if it facilitates China’s strategic interests.

For example, KIC China has worked closely with the Torch Center of China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the very agency responsible for overseeing China’s 178 national high-tech industrial development zones and a major player in China’s military-civil fusion policies. In September 2024, during Shanghai’s Pujiang Innovation Forum, KIC China signed a formal MOU with the Torch Center to deepen cooperation in technology commercialization. From China’s perspective, partnering with KIC gives it direct channels to tap South Korea’s innovation pipeline. The very theme of the forum was to promote “scientific and technological exchanges and technology transfer outcomes between Korea and China” (한중 양국간 과학기술 교류 및 기술이전 성과). In other words, it directly aimed to channel Korean innovations into Chinese industry. KIC Chairman Kim Jong-moon explicitly stated that KIC China will “systematically and continuously pursue Korea-China technology transfer projects” by working closely with Chinese government agencies and regional governments. This candor is striking – KIC is essentially pledging to assist Chinese authorities in obtaining and commercializing technology from Korea.

Beyond MIIT, KIC China has ties with China’s Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) and its affiliated bodies. The International Technology Transfer Network (ITTN), a Beijing-based organization under MOST, has been a partner in past events such as a 2022 Metaverse industry forum co-hosted with KIC China. ITTN is a national-level international tech transfer institution authorized by the Chinese government, created in 2011 to actively connect foreign technology with Chinese companies. ITTN’s mandate, backed by Beijing, is to scour the globe for innovations that can be brought into China’s ecosystem. Its secretary-general emphasized the need for more tech “import” into China in an interview last year. KIC China’s work with ITTN thus directly plugs Korean startups into an official Chinese conduit for tech acquisition.

Other Chinese partners include provincial and municipal tech bureaus and United Front-adjacent organizations that serve Beijing’s soft power and influence goals. At the Guangzhou GSF event, for instance, the Guangdong Provincial Government co-hosted with KIC, and officials from the Guangdong Academy of Sciences and a local tech association joined KIC in signing cooperation agreements. These local partners, while focused on economic development, ultimately align with central policies to localize foreign tech knowledge.

Even more revealing is KIC China’s engagement with networks of overseas Korean scientists, which the Chinese government is keen to leverage. During the Asia-Korea Conference (AKC) 2024 in Shanghai – a scientific conference for ethnic Korean scientists and engineers across Asia – KIC China organized a special session to link Korean SMEs with Chinese entities. In that session, a three-way MOU was signed between KIC China, China’s National Eastern Tech-Transfer Center (a state tech-transfer hub in Shanghai), and the Korean Scientists and Engineers Association in China. This marked the first time the Korean scientists’ association in China formalized a partnership with a Chinese government institution, an “important first step” toward ongoing collaboration. In essence, KIC China helped broker a deal tying an overseas Korean professional group into China’s tech transfer framework.

Such moves align with Beijing’s broader United Front strategy of co-opting overseas talent and networks for China’s benefit. By cultivating friendly relations with Korean expat researchers and entrepreneurs (often via conferences and associations), China gains informal access to expertise and IP that might otherwise stay off-limits. The KIC-facilitated AKC gave Chinese investors a window into Korean startups, and the signing with the diaspora association provides Chinese agencies a channel to continue engaging Korean experts on Chinese soil.

Here I would like to stop and make clear once more: none of this is to suggest KIC China is intentionally abetting illicit behavior. On the contrary, its activities are public and framed as government-approved cooperation. But the alignment of KIC China’s partners with Beijing’s state interests is unmistakable and poses significant risks. From the Torch Center to municipal tech commissions and national tech transfer centers, KIC’s Chinese counterparts are not independent firms but arms of the Chinese state or Party-led entities.

South Korean Firms Caught in the Middle

For the Korean companies involved, KIC China’s platform is a double-edged sword. It offers tremendous opportunity but also exposes them to heightened security risks. On one hand, ventures like DeepBrain AI or the hydrogen fuel-cell makers have gained visibility and connections through KIC programs that they likely could not have achieved on their own. Some have attracted Chinese customers or investments that could propel their growth. South Korea’s domestic market is relatively small, so tapping China’s vast market can be a huge windfall.

The allure of partnerships with giants like Huawei, Tencent, or BYD (all companies headquartered in the regions where KIC operates programs) is strong. KIC China often highlights success stories of Korean firms securing deals in China as proof of a “win-win.” For example, at the Guangzhou GSF event, KIC officials noted that the Greater Bay Area is home to companies like Tencent, BYD, Huawei, which are household names and potential partners.

Yet these very Chinese companies exemplify why Korean tech proprietors must be cautious. Huawei and others have been accused internationally of benefitting from Chinese state subsidies and of blurring lines between commercial and military use of technology. If a Korean AI startup partners with Huawei, it may gain a huge customer, but it could also find its intellectual property gradually absorbed into Huawei’s own R&D – or even see its tech used in ways it never intended, such as surveillance or censorship tools.

There have already been cautionary tales. Although specific cases involving KIC China facilitation are not public, South Korean media have reported multiple instances of Chinese companies allegedly stealing Korean tech after collaborative ventures. The most famous example in the semiconductor industry involved a former Samsung Electronics employee attempting to transfer chip factory blueprint files to a Chinese partner. Each new partnership arranged through KIC China must be evaluated in this context.

Of course, not every interaction via KIC China will lead to IP theft, but outright “theft” is not the only concern. Intellectual property diffusion can happen in subtle ways. A Korean robotics firm might train a Chinese partner’s engineers as part of a sales deal – only to find those engineers later leverage the knowledge to develop a competing robot, undercutting the Korean firm. Or a Korean AI software company might integrate its system for a Chinese client, inevitably revealing source code or algorithms during integration, which then get reused elsewhere without permission. This isn’t scaremongering. It is already happening on a wide scale.

These scenarios underscore the need for vigilance. Due diligence on Chinese partners is essential: Korean companies should vet whether an interested Chinese investor has ties to any entity on sanction or watch lists, or has a pattern of litigation over IP. Agreements should include clauses to protect trade secrets and limit use of shared tech beyond the scope of the project. Korean participants might also seek guidance from their government, and most importantly, South Korean lawmakers should question whether programs like KIC adequately safeguard against technology leakage.

Conclusion: Balancing Innovation and Security

KIC China occupies a challenging position at the intersection of cooperation and competition. On one hand, it embodies South Korea’s drive to be a global innovation player and leverage China’s vast economy to scale up its startups. Access to China’s market is understandably tantalizing to a small-scale Korean startup, and the opportunity to make massive short term profits are real. The exchanges facilitated by KIC China have indeed led to Korean innovations being adopted in China, and conversely exposed Korean entrepreneurs to China’s tech scene. In principle, such collaboration can be “win-win” - if IP rights are respected.

However, in practice, the power dynamics and national agendas at play make this a delicate tightrope walk. China’s state-backed institutions involved with KIC China are not shy about their goals. The subtext is that China is hungry for technology, and any foreign partner must protect its interests. For South Korea, the key is to approach tech cooperation with eyes wide open. KIC China’s existence shows that Seoul believes engagement with China can be beneficial, but it must be managed. South Korea will need to continually recalibrate KIC China’s role so that it remains a gateway for mutual innovation rather than a backdoor for unreciprocated tech transfer. In the end, transparency and vigilance are key.