OFAC Sanctions Data — July 2026

Over the past month, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated 101 legal entities and removed 57 legal entities from its sanctions lists. This report excludes individuals and maritime vessels to isolate structural enforcement trends.

The two charts below draw on OFAC data as of 01 August 2026. The first tracks the volume of distinct legal entities designated per calendar month since January 2025. The second breaks down the primary country distribution of entities added during July 2026.

New Designations per Month — Jan 2025 to Jul 2026

July’s 101 legal-entity designations was not the highest of the year, but it reveals two distinct enforcement themes: continued pressure on Iran-linked maritime structures and a large Mexico action targeting CJNG-linked corporate networks.

Country Breakdown — July 2026

Iran ranks behind Cuba, Mexico, and the UAE when entities are grouped by their reported primary country. That does not reflect the full Iran-related exposure: 48% of July’s designations were made under IRAN-EO13902. Mexico stands out separately because all 16 entities discussed below were designated in a CJNG-related illicit-drugs action.

Analysis of Network Designations

This month’s OFAC designations form the latest tranche in a sustained campaign against the expansive illicit shipping and sanctions-evasion network of Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani, the son of a senior Iranian regime figure. The July 14, 2026 action targeted more than 50 individuals, entities, and vessels under E.O. 13902, bringing the cumulative total of Shamkhani-linked designations above 200. The network has long facilitated Iranian (and Russian) oil exports; the newest designations also highlight its expansion into global containerized shipping and the blending of licit and illicit cargo (Treasury press release, 14 July 2026; OFAC recent actions).

Geographic Breakdown of Linked Shipping Entities

The following 20 shipping entities in the network span six jurisdictions, with the largest concentrations in the United Arab Emirates and the Marshall Islands. The concentration in shipping-management and registration jurisdictions shows how the network reaches beyond Iran’s borders.

  • United Arab Emirates (5 entities)
    • LUBECK SHIPPING LLC
    • WE FREIGHT SHIPPING LLC
    • DEZERA SHIPPING FZCO
    • GLAVOS SHIPPING FZCO
    • VOLTA SHIPPING SERVICES LLC
  • Marshall Islands (5 entities)
    • HANSA SHIPPING INC.
    • AARE LINES INC.
    • KANGRI 1 INC
    • HOPE 1 SHIPPING INC
    • PLATINUM KNIGHTS LTD
  • Saint Kitts and Nevis (2 entities):
    • NUVETRRO SHIPPING INC
    • VELTRRIVO SHIPPING INC
  • China (2 entities):
    • OCEAN SEARUM ONE LIMITED
    • SAI WAN SHIPPING LIMITED
  • Iran (2 entities):
    • SEPEHR NOOR MOBIN COMPANY
    • AVA TARABAR DARYA COMPANY
  • Singapore (1 entity):
    • SEA LEAD SHIPPING PTE. LTD.

Illicit Drugs

In OFAC’s July 2026 designations under Executive Order 14059, Mexico accounted for the bulk of new activity. All 16 legal entities in this action were designated under both the ILLICIT-DRUGS-EO14059 and SDGT programs as part of Treasury’s largest single action ever targeting Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG). Rather than focusing solely on trafficking cells, the designations hit a network of family-controlled companies that provide commercial cover, alternative revenue, and logistical support across western Mexico—primarily Jalisco, Nayarit, and Michoacán (Treasury press release, 14 July 2026; OFAC recent actions, 23 July 2026).

  • Agriculture, Agave & Beverage Crops (4 entities)

    Several companies operate in tequila, agave, and related crop production. Their inclusion shows that the action reached commercial sectors beyond traditional trafficking logistics. These sit inside the networks of senior CJNG figures including Roberto Jiménez Arias and Gerardo “El Cachas” Botello.

    • GREEN AGROPACIFIC S.P.R. DE R.L. DE C.V.
    • CASA TEQUILERA EL ORIGEN DEL TEQUILA S.A. DE C.V.
    • AGROPECUARIA AMATEQ DEL VALLE S.A. DE C.V.
    • RANCHO SAN MIGUEL LOS TRES HERMANOS S.P.R. DE R.L. DE C.V.
  • Retail & Consumer Goods (5 entities)

    Everyday retail businesses like food, liquor, baby shoes, textiles, and supplements appear repeatedly. Their inclusion shows that the action extended to ordinary consumer-facing sectors rather than transport and financial services alone.

    • MEDIN PRODUCTS (a.k.a. MEDIN PRODUCTS S.A.S.)
    • EL ALMACEN LICORERIA
    • BUBUX BABY SHOES S.A. DE C.V.
    • STELLA SERVICIOS COMERCIALES Y EMPRESARIALES S.A. DE C.V.
    • MUNDO FIT SUPLEMENTOS S.A. DE C.V.
  • Logistics, Transport & Holding Companies (2 entities)

    Transportation and holding structures can enable a broader network. OFAC specifically linked one logistics firm to the diversion of liquid fentanyl, while the other operates as a holding company.

    • TRANSIC LOGISTIC S.A. DE C.V.
    • OPTIC PRIVATE TRANSPORTATION S.A. DE C.V.
  • Energy & Fuel Retail (2 entities)
    • STRONG ENERGY S.A. DE C.V.
    • PETROCODA S.A. DE C.V.
  • Construction & Manufacturing (2 entities)
    • HURRARI KASH S.A. PROMOTORA DE INVERSION DE C.V. (construction)
    • PRODUCTORES VAGU S.A. DE C.V. (furniture manufacturing)
  • Private Security (1 entity)
    • CORPORATIVO DE SEGURIDAD PRIVADA ALFA Y GAMA S.A. DE C.V.

The common thread is the ownership and control links identified by OFAC. The action reaches companies connected to relatives and close associates of CJNG leaders such as Audias “Jardinero” Flores Silva and Gerardo “El Cachas” Botello. It therefore targets the commercial ecosystem that Treasury says supports the cartel’s operations across ordinary Mexican business sectors.

What this means

July’s actions show that exposure is not confined to a sanctioned vessel or a cartel front. It can sit in a shipping manager, holding company, fuel retailer, producer, or consumer business linked through ownership, management, trade, or logistics. Lazlo Intelligence traces these company-to-company links from public sources so you can assess the network around a sanctioned entity before it becomes a problem. Search any entity to investigate its connections.

Previous Reports